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ReviewAccording to a common conception in behavioral
decision research, two cognitive processes—overesti-
mation and overweighting—operate to increase the
impact of rare events on people’s choices. Supportive
findings stem primarily from investigations in which
people learn about options via descriptions thereof.
Recently, a number of researchers have begun to inves-
tigate risky choice in settings in which people learn
about options by experiential sampling over time. This
article reviews work across three experiential para-
digms. Converging findings show that when people
make decisions based on experience, rare events tend
to have less impact than they deserve according to their
objective probabilities. Striking similarities in human
and animal experience-based choices, ways of modeling
these choices, and their implications for risk and precau-
tionary behavior are discussed.
Beware of black swans
In 2009, the world found itself in the midst of the worst
recession since the Great Depression. Events thought of as
extremely unlikely, such as the bust of the U.S. housing
boom, the meltdown of the financial system, and the bank-
ruptcy of colossal companies, happened in breathtakingly
fast succession. Why was the world so badly prepared for
these unlikely events? One explanation is that the crisis of
the financial industry preceding the economic recession
occurred because the industry’s supposedly optimal risk
management models failed to reckon with ‘black swans’—
unexpected and unpredictable rare events that carry an
enormous impact [1]. Of course, not only modern risk man-
agement paradigms failed to take the black-swan event into
account—so did individual players, such as many home-
owners who could no longer afford their mortgages. Can
psychological theories and findings account for such blind
spots?At first glance, the answer is no. Influential studies in
behavioral decision research consistently suggest the oppo-
site propensity: people are oversensitive to rare events. For
example, they overestimate the chance of food poisoning or
of lung cancer resulting from smoking [2,3]. Moreover,
people are depicted as remembering past experiences by
how they felt at the peak (rare moment) of their experience
and how they felt when the experience came to an end [4].
Such oversensitivity is not only empirically observed but
also theoretically suggested. According to the most influen-
tial descriptive theory of risky choice, people overweightCorresponding author: Hertwig, R. (Ralph.Hertwig@unibas.ch)
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theory explains the puzzling co-occurrence of two beha-
viors—that the same people who purchase lottery tickets
thatpromise tiny chances ofwinningalso takeout insurance
against tiny chances of damage [6]—by the assumption that
small probabilities receive ‘too much’ weight.
In light of people’s ostensible oversensitivity to rare
events, why did so many people, financial experts and
private citizens alike, behave as if they were not cognizant
of the rare events that triggered what some called a bona-
fide depression [7]? Analyses have highlighted a variety of
enabling factors, ranging from purportedly rational bank-
ers who acted on strong incentives to take maximum risks
in their lending [7] to humans’ ‘animal spirits’ [8]. How-
ever, there is another possibly enabling condition. The
customary portrayal of people as being oversensitive to
rare events neglects that when people recruit their experi-
ence sampled across time to make risky decisions, chances
are that rare events (such as the burst of housing bubbles)
receive less impact than they deserve according to their
objective probabilities.
The description–experience gap
Just as biologists use theDrosophila (fruit fly) as onemodel
organism, behavioral decision researchers have used
choice between monetary gambles as a model for risky
choice, assuming that many real-world options have the
same properties as gambles, namely, n outcomes and
associated probabilities [9]. Moreover, many researchers
have grown accustomed to presenting their respondents
with one particular genus of the fruit fly: gambles in which
all outcomes and their probabilities are stated, and respon-
dents make a single choice. Figure 1 illustrates a typical
description-based decision problem.
In everyday life, however, people can rarely peruse such
descriptions of probability distributions (there are a few
exceptions such as media weather forecasts stating prob-
abilities of precipitation [10]). When people decide whether
to take out a mortgage loan or contemplate the success of a
first date there are no tabulated risks to consult. Instead,
they need to rely on their experiences—if existent—with
these options, thusmaking decisions from experience rather
than decisions from description [11]. Both kinds of decisions
can be understood as opposite entries on a continuum of
uncertainty about what one is choosing between. Using
Knight’s terminology [12], decisions from descriptions
involveapriori probabilities, whereasdecisions fromexperi-
ence involvestatisticalprobabilities,whichmustbeassessed9.004 Available online 14 October 2009 517
Figure 1. How to study decisions from description and experience? (a) The choice
task in decisions from description typically consists of two monetary gambles with
explicitly stated outcomes and their probabilities. In decisions from experience,
three paradigms have been employed: (b) The sampling paradigm consists of an
initial sampling stage (here represented by seven fictitious draws) in which a
person explores two payoff distributions without costs by clicking on one of the
two buttons on the computer screen, followed by an outcome drawn from the
respective distribution. The buttons chosen by a participant are marked in red.
After terminating sampling, the person sees a choice screen (green screen) and is
asked to select the button to draw once for real. (c) The partial-feedback paradigm
collapses sampling and choice, thus each draw represents both an act of
exploration and an act of exploitation. The respondent receives feedback
regarding the obtained payoff after each draw from the chosen button (red box).
(d) The full-feedback paradigm is identical to the partial-feedback paradigm, except
that it also provides feedback concerning the forgone payoff (i.e. the payoff that
the person would have received, had she chosen the other option; white box).
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.13 No.12‘if at all, by tabulating the results of experience’ (p. 215), and
therefore they invariably fall short of the standards of
accuracy set by a priori probabilities [13].
In the 1950s and early 1960s, prior to the advent of
modern behavioral decision research, decision scientists
investigated decisions from experience. They examined, for
example whether and how people learn the probability
structure over outcomes through trial-by-trial feedback
(for a review see [14]). Perhaps, because of the designs’
impracticality—purportedly hundreds of trials are needed
before behavior stabilizes—modern behavioral decision518researchers turned away from the transients of learning
(for an exception see, for example [15]). Moreover, with the
increasing importance of expected utility theory, the study
of anomalies became pertinent; those required the convey-
ing of perfect information about the probabilities of
relevant events (Figure 1). Interest in issues of learning
and experience-based decisions, however, remained alive
in other fields such as operation research (see literature on
multi-armed bandit problems [16]).
Modern decision scientists’ interest in decisions from
experience has been rekindled by the recent observation of
systematic and robust differences between decisions based
on experience and description. Research on decisions from
experience has come with a simple experimental tool, a
‘computerized money machine.’ Respondents see two but-
tons on a computer screen, each one representing an
initially unknown payoff distribution (Figure 1). Clicking
a button results in a randomdraw from those distributions.
Three variations of this experimental tool have been
employed. In the sampling paradigm, people first sample
as many outcomes as they wish and only then decide from
which distribution tomake a single draw for real [11,17]. In
the full-feedback paradigm, each draw contributes to
people’s earnings and they receive draw-by-draw feedback
on the obtained and the forgone payoffs (i.e. payoff received
had the other option been selected) [18]. The partial-feed-
back paradigm is identical to the full-feedback paradigm,
except that people only learn about the obtained payoffs
[19,20]. Here, unlike in the first two paradigms, respon-
dents face an exploitation–exploration tradeoff. Exploita-
tion and exploration represent two goals associated with
every choice, namely, to obtain a desired outcome (exploi-
tation) or to gather new information about other, perhaps
better, actions (exploration) [21].
Across all three experiential paradigms, a robust and
systematic description–experience gap has emerged in
numerous studies. Figure 2 illustrates this gap in six
decision problems [22]. Each one offers a choice between a
risky option with two outcomes and a safe option. In the
risky options, either the desirable outcome or the less desir-
able outcome occurs with low probability (probability of 0.1
or less). In all three experiential paradigms, respondents
tend to select the risky option when the desirable outcome
occurswith highprobability, and select the safe optionwhen
the desirable outcome occurs with low probability. This
tendency is reversed in decisions from description, and
the general pattern can be summarized as follows: in de-
cisions from experience, people behave as if the rare events
have less impact than they deserve according to their objec-
tive probabilities, whereas in decisions from description
people behave as if the rare events have more impact than
they deserve (consistent with cumulative prospect theory).
What causes the description–experience gap?
Several causes have been proposed as contributing to the
description–experience gap. These are reviewed in the
following section.
Small samples
Based on people’s search in the sampling paradigm,
reliance on small samples has been proposed as one factor
Figure 2. The description–experience gap. Proportion of choices of the risky option (i.e. risky choice) as a function of the probability of the more desirable outcome in 6 of
120 problems studied in [22]. Each presents a choice between a risky option and a safe option. The decision problems and the expected values (EV) of the risky options are
displayed below. Each problemwas studied using the four paradigms listed in Figure 1 [22; the data from the full-feedback are reported in Nevo, I, and Erev, I, unpublished].
Participants (20 per paradigm) were paid (in Shekels) for one of their choices, randomly selected. The partial and full-feedback paradigms involved 100 choices per problem,
and the reported proportions are the means over these choices and participants.
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[11]. Across numerous studies, respondents typically
proved restrained in their information search, with a
median number of samples per choice problem typically
ranging between 11 and 19 across studies (reviewed in
[13]). For such samples, chances are that a person does not
even experience the rare event.More generally, one ismore
likely to undersample than to oversample the rare event.
This is because the binomial distribution for the number of
times a particular outcome will be observed in n indepen-
dent trials is markedly skewed when p is small (i.e. the
event is rare) and n is small (i.e. few outcomes are
sampled). Reliance on small samples has also been dis-
cussed as a potential explanation for bumblebees’ under-
weighting of rare events (Box 1).
This explanation in terms of small samples has
prompted a critical response [26] and has led to an ongoing
debate. What appears to be underweighting of rare events
in decisions from experience could be consistent with over-
weighting of low probabilities as assumed in cumulative
prospect theory. When the probability experienced in a
sample is smaller than the event’s objective probability,
people might still overweight this sample probability.
Despite this overweighting, the erroneous impression ofunderweighting would emerge if the overweighting did not
fully compensate for the underestimation because of the
skew in small samples. In this view, the description–
experience gap is statistical (sampling error) rather than
psychological in nature.
Several approaches have been taken to examine
whether the gap observed in the sampling paradigm can
indeed be reduced to sampling error (why people appear to
rely on small samples has received scant attention but see
Ref. [15,27]). If sampling error were the sole culprit, then
reducing the error by extending the sample should attenu-
ate and eventually eliminate the gap. Increasing sample
sizes substantially (up to 50 and 100 draws per choice
problem) could reduce but did not eliminate the gap
[13,28]. If sampling error caused the gap, then removing
the error by aligning experienced probabilities in the
sample to the objective probabilities should eliminate it;
it did not [29]. If sampling error were the sole root of the
gap, then presenting respondents in the description con-
dition with the exact same information that others experi-
enced (‘yoking’) should eliminate the gap. In one study it
did [30]; in another it did for small but not for large samples
[13; see these authors’ discussion of ‘trivial choices’ as one
possible explanation for the mixed results obtained].519
Box 1. The common characteristics of human and other
animals’ decisions from experience
Humans and animals alike face uncertain environments. By study-
ing decisions from experience, researchers enjoy the surplus benefit
of being able to better understand human choice by discovering
how it resembles or differs from choices made by other animals.
There is some indication that an attenuated impact of rare events
characterizes both humans’ and animals’ decisions from experi-
ence. Investigating the foraging behavior of bees across floral
rewards distributions, Real concluded that ‘bumblebees under-
perceive rare events and overperceive common events’ (p. 985) [23].
Moreover, he observed that ‘bees frame their decisions on the basis
of only a few visits’ (p. S133), and suggested that such reliance on
small samples might be adaptive when there is a high degree of
spatial autocorrelation in the distributions of floral rewards [24].
Placing people into situations in which they render decisions from
experience also led to the discovery that risk preference in humans,
birds and insects is better predicted in terms of the coefficient of
variation (CV), a measure of risk per unit of return, than outcome
variance, the measure typically used in normative models such as
expected utility theory [17].
A striking difference between humans’ and other animals’
decisions from experience could be resolved by taking properties
of reward into account [25]. In studies of animal choice, ‘partici-
pants’ such as rats receive rewards in the form of cups of water and
thus discern differences in rewards less accurately than humans
who receive the rewards in the form of digital numbers. When the
perceptual noise in the presentation of rewards is increased,
however, humans exhibit the same pattern of choices as animals.
Similarly, when perceptual noise is decreased and discrimination
becomes easier, honeybees display the same choices as humans. In
general, in experience-based choices humans and honeybees alike
appear to deviate from maximization in favor of the alternative
perceived to lead to better outcomes most of the time (thereby
underweighting rare events).
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sented both descriptions and experience, relative to just
descriptions [31].
At this point, the reality of the description–experience
gap across the three experiential paradigms is unchal-
lenged—its cause, however, is debated. Some researchers
have argued that the gap in the sampling paradigm is
statistical in nature [26,30,32]; others have proposed that
the sampling error is not the sole cause [11,13,28,29].
Regardless of how this debate will advance, it is informa-
tive to go beyond the sampling paradigm. Reliance on small
samples, for example, cannot be the reason behind the
description–experience gap in the full-feedback paradigm,
in which rare events’ impact is attenuated even after a
hundred of trials with perfect feedback. Beyond sampling
error, what psychological factors might be in play?
Recency
A psychological factor proposed to contribute to the
description–experience gap is recency [11]. Ubiquitously
observed in memory, belief updating and judgments [33],
recency refers to the phenomenon that observations made
late in a sequence receive more weight than they deserve
(i.e. more than 1/n). Recency is closely related to reliance on
small samples: the small sample of recent events can
reintroduce the aforementioned skew into large samples
of experience. Although the original finding was that
people givemore weight to outcomes that occurred recently
in the flow of their experience relative to previous outcomes520[11], no or little impact of recency was observed in later
studies [13,29,30].
Estimation error
In theory, the description–experience gap could also be the
consequence of a systematic estimation error [26], with
people systematically underestimating the frequencies of
the rare event experienced in the sample. Studies of fre-
quency and probability assessments, however, commonly
report overestimation of rare events [2,34]. Moreover,
studies recording people’s estimates of rare events in the
sampling paradigm found them to be well calibrated or a
little too high, relative to the experienced frequency
[28,29]. That is, people do not systematically estimate rare
things to be even rarer.
Contingent sampling
Still another factor that could underlie the description–
experience gap, especially in the feedback paradigm, is
the notion that people inform their decisions by recruit-
ing recent and past experiences garnered in similar
situations ([35,36] for related notions). Such contingent
sampling is likely to be ubiquitous ‘in the wild’ [37]. For
example, when firefighters need to predict the behavior of
a fire they appear to retrieve from memory similar
instances from the past. Contingent sampling implies
recency and reliance on small sampling to the extent
that similarity decreases with time. Furthermore, in
dynamic environments (e.g. restless bandit problem
[38]), reliance on similar experiences is an efficient heur-
istic [39]. Admittedly, one weakness of the notion of
contingent sampling is the fuzzy term ‘similarity.’ How-
ever, defining similarity within a formal model is not
impossible, as the result of a recent model competition
demonstrated (Box 2).
Information format and cognitive algorithms
Finally, the description–experience gap might be partly
caused by different formats of statistical information trig-
gering different cognitive algorithms [13,28]. Most inves-
tigations of decisions from description represent the
likelihood of outcomes in terms of single-event probabil-
ities (or percentages). In experiential paradigms, in con-
trast, people come across sequences of events, without an
explicit synopsis of the events’ probabilities. This differ-
ence echoes the distinction between single-event probabil-
ities and natural frequencies in Bayesian reasoning, with
the different format giving rise to different cognitive algor-
ithms and degrees of Bayesian reasoning [44,45]. By ana-
logy, the sequential experience of events might trigger
different cognitive algorithms than those triggered by
described single-event probabilities.
In sum, modern behavioral decision research was
strongly focused on people’s responses to descriptions of
events. In recent years, three experiential paradigms have
been used to study how experience affects risky choice. A
consistent picture has emerged. Where rare events are
implicated, description-based and experience-based de-
cisions can drastically diverge. Next to sampling error, a
number of psychological factors have been proposed. One
important question for the future is to find which of these
Box 2. How to account for decisions from experience:
model competitions
Decisions from description can differ systematically from decisions
from experience. Experience-based decisions, for example, appear
to reverse the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes that has been found
in decisions from description [40], provoking a call for two different
theories of risky choice [11,17,41]. Others, however, have responded
that cumulative prospect theory, initially designed for decisions
from description, could also account for decisions from experience
[26]. To evaluate how well a model predicts people’s choices, its
performance needs to be compared to those of other modes.
Several model competitions involving decisions from experience
have been conducted ([28,42]; the most extensive one was the
choice prediction competition held at the Technion [22].
The Technion competition consisted of three contests involving the
description, the sampling and the partial-feedback paradigms
(Figure 1). The objective in all three contests was to predict the
proportion of people who prefer a safe option with a medium payoff
to a risky option yielding two payoffs, one high, the other one low.
Each contest was based on two sets of choice data, a fitting and a
competition set. In order to generate both datasets, the same method
and participant pool was used, and each dataset consisted of 60
randomly selected problemswith the aforementioned properties. The
fitting set, together with the fit of several baseline modes, was posted
on a website, and enabled researchers to fit the model that they
thought would perform best in predicting the competition set.
Fourteen teams responded to the challenge, representing a wide
range of theoretical approaches (e.g. heuristics, algebraic models,
logit-regression model and a model based on the ACT-framework).
Again, the empirical data revealed a substantial description–
experience gap, thus replicating previous results. Notwithstanding
the limited psychological plausibility of some of the leading models,
the description–experience gap is also reflected in the models that
performed well in the three contests. In decisions from description,
the best-performing model was a stochastic version of cumulative
prospect theory with decision weight estimates reflecting over-
weighting of rare events. All leading models in the two experience
contests share the assumption that prior to choice the decision
maker recalls a small set of about five experiences with each option,
and tends to select that option resulting in better outcomes in this
sample. In addition, the winning model in the partial feedback
paradigm implemented the notion of contingent sampling (see text).
Note that this model competition is featured in a special edition of
the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making devoted to the topic of
‘decisions from experience’ [43].
Box 3. Outstanding questions
 Statistical and psychological factors have been suggested as
causes for the description–experience gap. Which of these factors
operate across all three experiential paradigms (Figure 1), and will
ultimately be part of a comprehensive framework of the descrip-
tion–experience gap?
 Why do people rely on small samples (and recency) in decisions
from experience? Does this reliance reflect memory constraints or
lack of motivation? Is it an adaptive response to environmental
properties (e.g. a fast-changing environment) that is generalized
to static environments? Do people terminate search early because
small samples may render choice easier by amplifying the
difference between options?
 Which models or which class of models will best predict search
and choice behavior across the three experiential paradigms of
decisions from experience: models that assume that people form
an explicit representation of sampled probabilities, or models that
forgo such explicit representation of uncertainty such as some
heuristics (e.g. minimax, natural-mean heuristic) or associative
learning models?
 Decisions from experience have typically been studied in stable
environments in which the underlying probability distribution
does not change. Many real-world environments, however, are
dynamic (e.g. a depleting patch of food). How do people make
decisions from experience in such environments?
 Merely mentioning or presenting an event or focusing people’s
attention on one event seems to increase its psychological impact
or increase its estimated frequency or probability, or both. What
explains the psychological power of mere descriptions?
 When rare events do occur, their psychological impact often
exceeds the impact deserved in light of their likelihoods. Beyond
probability weighting functions, how can the heightened impact
of experienced rare events be modeled? How long does their
impact last?
 Many domains present people with experience, with descriptions,
or with both. Established research paradigms, however, often
focus on just one way of presenting information at the expense of
others. For example, in social games or in deductive and inductive
reasoning tasks people receive descriptions. Would a description–
experience gap emerge? For example, could it be that a
completely described social game nudges responders to focus
on fair and efficient outcomes, whereas incomplete and experi-
enced information reduces the impact of these concerns?
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Box 3).
Three more issues merit brief discussion. First, under-
weighting of rare events as measured in terms of the
parameters of the decision-weighting function of cumulat-
ive prospect theory [5] is not a necessary condition for the
description–experience gap. A gap can emerge if the
parameters fitted to experience-based choices reflect linear
weighting or underweighting for rare events [28,29]. Sec-
ond, experience and description can be combined inmyriad
ways, resulting in a rich set of results [46,47]. For example,
re-entering experience into decisions from description—
people responded repeatedly to the same choice problem
and received trial-by-trial feedback—moved individuals’
decision weights toward objective probability weighting
[31]. Re-entering description of outcomes in the sampling
paradigm, in turn, appeared to increase the impact of rare
events—the mere presentation effect [47]. This effect
might also be at work in studies that have observed that
rare events are overestimated or overweighted in decisions
from descriptions [2,3,5].A final issue concerns the potential redundancy of the
three experiential paradigms (Figure 1). They are not
redundant. The partial-feedback paradigm, for example
yields more safe choices than the full-feedback paradigm
[18,48]. This difference might be a product of the hot-stove
effect. AsMark Twain observed, if a cat happens to jump on
a stove that is hot, it will never jump on one again, thus
never learning to distinguish between hot and cold stoves.
When feedback is limited to the obtained payoff, as in the
partial-feedback paradigm, people are more likely to
behave risk averse, thus reducing the probability of
sampling alternatives with poor past financial and social
outcomes [49,50]. This brings the discussion full circle to
where it began. Generations growing up in a period of low
stock returns appear to take an unusually cautious
approach to investing, even decades later (although recent
experience matters, too) [Malmendier, U. and Nagel, S.,
unpublished]. In other words, today’s teenagers who have
experienced this dramatic economic slump might years
later enter the stock and housing market much more
cautiously than their parents did. Perhaps, it is also they
who will experience other global changes first-hand and
behave differently than their parents did (Box 4).521
Box 4. Decisions from experience: implications for risk
behavior and precautions
How could one design a safer human environment? According to
one perspective, one could aim to make people well aware of and
tuned to the risks or hazards that they face by informing them about
their statistical probabilities. For example, before each broadcast of
a Soccer World Cup game, a warning could be aired telling viewers
that watching a stressful soccer match more than doubles the risk of
an acute cardiovascular event [51]. Such safety warnings could be
extended to any activity that people might embark on, from having
unprotected sex to consuming a caffeinated energy drink [52]. Thus,
equipped with a complete description of the world’s pitfalls, people
could make rational decisions.
Admittedly, this fully described world is both unattainable—
because of lack of information—and a caricature, although the ever-
increasing amount of information on food products (e.g. health
claims, content information), for example, suggests that some
agencies believe that endowing consumers with comprehensive
information is the best way to nudge them to healthy behaviors.
This design perspective, however, neglects that people’s risk
perception and behavior are also shaped by personal experiences.
If risks are rare, then chances are that a person mostly experiences
their non-occurrence, thus generating less concern than the risks
deserve according to their probabilities (now or in the future), and
more concern in those rare cases in which they do occur. This
simple regularity in people’s experience could explain why warn-
ings of the serious consequences of global warming do not make us
behave much ‘greener’—most of us have been hitherto spared
personal experiences with those consequences [53]. It also explains
why many Israeli drivers ‘learned’ to stop using a safety device that
they bought for good money (a car radio with a detachable panel to
protect from theft) within a year—nothing much had happened
recently [54]. Moreover, it accounts for why providing a warning
before rather than after having had a typically profitable or
enjoyable experience with risk taking increases the impact of the
warning [55].
How would a designer construct a safer environment, taking
people’s experience into account? Take the medical environment for
illustration. One precaution that medical professionals are supposed
to follow is to wear gloves when taking blood. Many doctors,
however, do not comply, probably relying on their personal
experiences, and downplaying the importance of this and other
precautions [56]. How can one change their behavior? Severe
sanctions administered with low probabilities are not likely to be
effective. Although doctors possibly overweight the sanctions when
they are announced, they might come to ignore them with the
experience that noncompliance rarely gets punished. Alternatively,
members of the medical team could be authorized to stop their
colleagues if they saw them skipping a precaution, gently reminding
them that this behavior puts them at risk. Such a design implies
‘mild’ punishment administered with high probability, and has been
shown to yield stable increases in precautionary behavior [Erev
et al., unpublished].
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Modern behavioral decision research has commonly
focused on decisions from description. The observations
stemming from this research suggest that humans over-
estimate and overweight rare events. Recent research
that enters experience in investigations of risky choice
find that people behave as if rare events receive less
impact than they deserve, relative to their objective
probabilities. These observations are not contradictory
but describe how the mind functions in two different
informational environments. In other words, one should
not play off research on description-based and experi-
ence-based behavior—their contrast is enlightening.
However, to better understand how people make522decisions with incomplete and uncertain information
‘in the wild’, there is a need to study experiential choices
that are often representative of people’s actual choices
[57], and to learn from the rich repertoire of previous
research into experience-based decisions and behaviors
[14,58].
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